We examine shifts in British income inequality and their causes over . Using newly re-discovered Inland Revenue income distribution estimates, we show that Britain had an unusually high concentration of personal incomes in 1911 compared to other industrial nations. We also find that Britain's substantial inequality reduction over the next four decades was largely driven by a collapse in top capital incomes. This parallels findings for France, the USA and other western countries, that reduced inequality was mainly caused by declining top unearned incomes, owing to economic shocks, policy responses, and non-market mechanisms associated with the retreat from globalization.
2 income shares, for those on over £5,000 per annum (37 percent more tax units, with 42 percent more income), together with a small proportional reduction in numbers and incomes in the £160-£5,000 range.
The 1911 estimation is also important as the only pre-1937 British estimate of the contributions of earned and capital income to total top incomes. We are thus able to examine the relative importance of earned and unearned incomes to the substantial fall in top income shares in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century and compare these trends with other western nations (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2003; Piketty and Saez, 2003; 2013) using a pre-1914 starting point.
We focus on changes in the incomes of the top 0.001 to 5 percent of the British income distribution. Top incomes are important because income redistributions in western countries are typically dominated by changes in the shares of this group, especially within the top percentile (Piketty and Saez, 2006, pp. 201-2) . Changes in top income shares have also been identified as key potential drivers of income inequality reduction in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century, given the very limited changes in inequality among wage/salaryearners (Lindert, 2000, p. 169; Gazeley et. al. 2017; Townsend, 1979, p. 139; Routh, 1965, pp. 51-108) . Examining top incomes is thus crucial to explaining the apparent paradox between a relatively stagnant income distribution among the bulk of the British population and the generally-assumed trend towards a more equal pre-tax income distribution (Lindert, 2000, p. 169).
We first focus in detail on the 1911 income distribution estimate and its methodologyas this data was not published, appears to have been confidential, and (to the best of our knowledge) has not been identified in previous studies. We then compare income shares using the 1900-1950 bench-mark years for which British income estimates are available (1911, 1918, making confidential estimates, especially in connection with any legislation... Estimates affecting particular ranges of income can only be satisfactory when it is possible to see how they fit in with all other incomes dealt with."
4 Unlike later official estimates, the 1911 estimation was kept confidential. The reasons for this are not discussed in the surviving records, but probably reflected the extreme political sensitivity of Britain's high concentration of income and wealth, in the wake of the new land taxes introduced in Lloyd George's 1909 "People's Budget" and the political storm and constitutional crisis this created (Offer, 1981, pp. 317-400).
The 1911 estimate covered people above the income tax threshold (£160 per annum) throughout the UK, including Ireland (and cannot be adjusted to exclude Ireland, as geographically disaggregated data are not available). The estimation was based on the income tax and super-tax returns (and, for unearned income, estate duty, settlement estate duty and probate data) with a series of adjustments to take account of estimated incomes that fell outside the tax data. Total taxable income comprised £322,531,000 of earned income and £543,923,000 of unearned income -from which was deducted an estimated £1,000,000 of unearned income for people below the tax threshold, plus £65,454,000 of "impersonal income" for companies and similar bodies. Total personal incomes over £160 thus amounted to approximately £866,454,000 minus £66,454,000, i.e. £800,000,000. 5 The IR regarded their income estimates between £160 and £700 to be "based on sufficiently accurate income tax figures to be beyond question", as they were calculated using income tax liabilities net of tax abatements. 6 However, classifying incomes between £700 and £5,000 was acknowledged to be more problematic, as this could only be done by taking a curve between these two points. When this was done for 6 earned and unearned income the curves seemed implausible, as the unearned line sloped gradually, while the earned line dropped sharply. 7 Moreover, the unearned income line cast doubt on the accuracy of estimated incomes over £5,000, derived from the super-tax data. Starting from a total unearned income of £525 million, it was noted that the income distribution should broadly correspond to the capital disclosed by each income group. In addition to around £280 million of capital declared for estate duty, there was an estimated £80 million not declared, as probate and settlement estate duty had been previously paid in respect of it. 8 The original "red line" estimate was based on the assumption that this hidden capital was distributed by income in the same proportion as declared capital. However, as officials noted, "In reality… the proportion of Settled Capital is higher in the larger estates, where great blocks of land etc., pass under settlement." 9 Further support for this correction was drawn from the fact that, while the line of total income ought to gradually approach the "unearned" line, the unearned line actually crossed the red total income line at £12,000, "thus giving the result that the unearned hypothetical income left after this point exceeds the corresponding total income declared for Super-Tax." 10 Thus a corrected "blue-line" estimate for unearned incomes was calculated, which was extended to all incomes over £700.
Incomes exceeding £5,000 were also adjusted by the deduction of life assurance premium tax allowances. Total insurance premium income allowed to income tax payers was £11,882,213, of which £1,500,000 was attributed to taxpayers with total incomes exceeding £5,000. Of this sum, £200,000 was estimated to apply to incomes of £5-6,000, some of which 7 Ibid. 8 Annual data for both of these duties were collated by the IR and published in their annual reports. Emphasis in original. 9 TNA, IR64/28, "Income tax. Classification of taxable income -year 1911-12," n.d., c. 1914. 10 Ibid.
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were exempted from super-tax by the deduction of insurance premiums. Assuming the true income of the £5-6,000 group to be around £25,000,000, a "liberal estimate" of £13,500,000 was taken as exempted from super-tax by the deduction of insurance premiums. The published super-tax incomes were therefore adjusted as follows:
(1) Published total £145,000,000
(2) Insurance premiums to incomes over £6,000 £1,300,000
(3) Insurance premiums to incomes of £5,000-6,000, used to secure exemption from super-tax £200,000 (4) Income exempted from super-tax under (3) £13,500,000
(5) Total super-tax adjusted to income-tax basis £160,000,000
Earned income for the over £5,000 group (£49,231,000) was estimated by subtracting earned income for income tax-payers below this threshold from total earned income; though direct estimates from the tax schedules produced a similar figure (around £50,000,000). 11 In determining unearned incomes, the aggregate capital declared for Estate Duty (£280,000,000) was adjusted upwards by an estimated £80,000,000 for capital not declared because probate and settlement estate duty had previously been paid in respect of it -concentrated among the larger estates. This revised "blue ink line" estimation raised incomes over £5,000 from being represented by log 8.204 = £160,000,000 to log 8.333 = £215,300,000. 12 This revision may still have under-estimated the income share of the very rich, as settlement estate duty -on which the revised calculations were made, was said to be commonly avoided (Mandler, 1997, p. 174) . Table 1 shows the IR's corrected "blue line" 1911 income distribution estimate, together with estimates of total personal incomes and the total UK population of "tax units":
either a single adult (or a single minor with income in his or her own right), or a married man and wife, together with their dependents -including those who did not pay any income tax (Lydall, 1959, p. 6) . It also shows net income tax and the average virtual (effective) income tax rate for each income group.
We follow the approach of the World Top Incomes Database and earlier studies in using tax data for top incomes and national accounts data for aggregate personal incomes (Piketty and Saez, 2013, pp. 457-8) . Our starting point is Tony Atkinson's (2007) estimates for both the tax unit and personal income totals. Atkinson's tax unit data are based on males and females aged 15 or over, minus married females (and ignoring minors under 15 with income). Given that 1911 was a Census year, this figure can be calculated directly from the Census reports.
This constructed figure was then adjusted proportionately by 0.977 -the difference between the 1949 Blue Book figure and the constructed figure (Atkinson, 2007, pp. 180-183 ).
Atkinson's tax unit estimate for 1911, 22,805,000, is somewhat higher than that estimated by Bowley (1919, p.11) for the 1911 occupied population (20.15 million). However, Atkinson's (2007, pp. 184-185) calculations from the 1911 Census indicate that the number of tax units exceeded the occupied population by 2.4 million, which would give a tax total of 22.65 million units.
For total income, we follow Atkinson's (2007, pp. 191-192) methodology, based on adjusting total "actual" income assessed by the Inland Revenue for income tax purposes (net of incomes below the exemption limit; incomes of non-profit institutions; dividends to nonresidents, and allowances for depreciation). Undistributed company profits are then subtracted, and the following items are added: non-assessed wages; plus salaries, self-employment income, and capital income, under the exemption limit. Atkinson's estimate, shown in the second column of Table 2 , uses the same actual assessed income figure as the IR's 1911 income distribution estimate (as the IR's adjustment to account for incomes exempted from super-tax 9 owing to insurance premiums is made to express it on an assessible gross income basis).
However, the IR used a lower estimate of relevant non-personal incomes, £65,454,000, which we substitute for Atkinson's estimate of undistributed profits in column 3.
Of the other components of total personal income used by Atkinson, wages constitute the only item that is large enough for errors to significantly bias the overall total. Salaries, selfemployment income, and dividends and capital income, below the tax threshold, are based on estimates for 1911 by Bowley (1937, p. 81) , which used 1911 population census data in conjunction with a 1909-10 British Association (Economics Section) enquiry into the earnings of "intermediate workers" (salaried or self-employed workers under the income tax threshold) (Cannan et. al., 1910) . Given the extensive data used in the Cannan et. al. survey, together with the relatively small contributions of these components of total income, any plausible errors are unlikely to significantly bias the total.
Atkinson's wages figure is based on Feinstein's (1972, p. T55) wage series, minus an estimated £8 million of wage income that fell within the exemption limit. Atkinson reduced this by 5 percent, "to allow for the fact that some wage income would have escaped the income of the Inland Revenue," (Atkinson, 2007, p.191) , based on post-1944 increases in wages following the introduction of PAYE (collection at source). While such a deduction was justified for later years, when many wage-earners paid income tax, it is more problematic for 1911, as almost all wage incomes were below the threshold. We thus further adjust the estimate in Column 4, using Feinstein's original wages figure. Given that an earlier estimate of 1911 wages, by Bowley (1937, p. 83) , gave a figure of £802 million (2.69 percent in excess of Feinstein's estimate), the potential margin of error appears small. Moreover, even a 10 percent underestimation of non-assessed wage income would only increase total personal income by 4.15 percent. Indeed, the most likely bias in the data is the one that all tax-based estimates are prone to -tax evasion/avoidance beyond that corrected for in the IR estimate.
A final question regarding the 1911 estimate is the extent to which 1911 was a "representative" pre-1914 benchmark. [ Table 3 near here]
Another important issue concerns the units of analysis. Tax units represent neither individuals (the units of income generation) or households (the primary units of expenditure).
There are strong conceptual arguments for taking the household as the relevant unit of analysis, especially in a historical context. Household income pooling (albeit incomplete) was common during the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, household-based measures control for intra-household specialisation between paid work, housework, and augmenting human capital through education and training (see De Vries, 2008, pp. 186-237 & 258-268; Bourke, 1994) . We consider that household-level measures provide valuable counterparts to tax-unit based estimates and intend to develop these in further work. However, this is beyond the scope of the current paper (as a full analysis would entail the use of a broad range of data, including recently-digitised household expenditure surveys and population census data, in addition to our tax data). To examine the extent to which the IR survey corroborates, or modifies, previous estimates, we compare the IR's estimate with an alternative estimate for 1911, mainly based on published IR data, by Lindert and Williamson (1983) , with subsequent corrections by Lindert (2000) , which builds on earlier work by Arthur Bowley, Josiah Stamp, and Guy Routh (hereafter BSR estimate). We assume that each assessed tax unit represents a household (which 11 is a reasonable approximation for the top five percent of income earners) and use the same personal income total as in Table 1 .
[ Table 4 near here]
As shown in Table 4 , the ratios of households with incomes over £160 in the two estimates are very similar, indicating that tax units are close proxies for households over this income range. However, there are substantial differences in parts of the distribution. Total incomes of £160 or above (roughly approximating to the top 5 percent of incomes) are slightly lower in the IR estimate than the BSR estimate, as indicated by the cumulative ratios. However, for incomes of over £5,000 (the top 0.12 percent of incomes, according to the IR estimate), incomes and households are 42 and 37 percent higher, respectively, than the BSR data.
Conversely, the £700-£5,000 band's income share is substantially reduced. This is as expected,
given that the main adjustments to the published IR data involved re-allocating tax-units and incomes in the £700-£5,000 bracket to higher income classes, owing to insurance premium exemptions and previously paid probate and settlement estate duty. The main impacts of these revised estimates are, therefore, to markedly increase the income shares of the super-rich (top 0.1 percent) and slightly reduce the shares of the 0.1 -5.0 percent. More generally, our estimate serves to confirm the broad findings of what are shown to be fairly reliable academic estimates of overall top British income shares in 1911, which had previously been described as "necessarily eclectic" (Lindert, 2000, p. 174) , owing to the absence of more detailed information.
ESTIMATES FOR 1918-1949
The First World War significantly reduced income inequality, including both a redistribution from the upper and middle-classes to the working-class and from skilled to less-skilled manual 12 workers (Routh, 1965, p. 104) . IR estimates of the income distribution for tax-payers in 1918
and 1919 were produced for evidence in two official enquiries. These covered just under a quarter and just under a third of all tax unit equivalents respectively, compared to only 4.9 per cent in the 1911 classification, reflecting the expansion of the income tax base. Table 5 shows the income distribution for 1918 and 1919, together with the tax levied at each income band (after allowances etc.).
The data were acknowledged to be imperfect, especially given the inadequate information available for estimating non-personal income and income accruing to residents abroad -collectively estimated at £230,000,000 for 1918 and £260,000,000 in 1919. 13 As profits under Schedule D were then assessed based on the average over the previous three years, the 1918 and 1919 data also partially reflect the very high profit rates of the War years and the wider inflationary environment (Lydall, 1959, p. 2) . Like the 1911 estimate, the data representing the super-tax income bands show substantially larger numbers of individual incomes than the super-tax data, suggesting that the figures were adjusted to take account of settled estates and similar distortions (UK, Inland Revenue, 1920, p. 85) .
[ Table 5 near here] 1918, 1919, 1937, and 1943-49 , where he used the IR income distribution estimates). Despite the 1918 and 1919 estimates typically being dismissed as irrelevant owing to the inflationary and turbulent conditions of these years (e.g. Bowley, 1942, p. 113 ),
Atkinson's data suggest that they were not atypical of the longer-term super-tax/surtax income trend.
[Figure 1 near here]
The next IR income distribution estimate, for 1937, was based on a special investigation of all tax returns for incomes of £200 or more (16.53 per cent of all tax units); the first of a series of what came to be known as "Surveys of Personal Incomes" (hereafter "SPI's") (UK, Inland Revenue, 1946, pp. 28-29) . Published data from the investigation provide very limited disaggregation for incomes over £20,000 -with only three income classes, the highest covering incomes over £50,000. Fortunately, the final working sheets from the survey have survived, enabling us to replace the three highest income classes with seven income classes, the highest of which covers £100,000 or more, in Table 6. 14 [ Table 6 near here]
Further estimates were made for 1938, 1941, 1947, and 1948 , based on the 1937 SPI, up-dated by the annual statistics of assessments and other data (UK, Parliamentary Debates, 1942; UK, Inland Revenue,1949, p. 34; UK, Inland Revenue, 1950, pp. 83-87) . In 1949 a new SPI was conducted, based on a 10 per cent sample survey of all income taxpayers (Lydall, 1959, p. 3) . The IR found that the 1949 SPI had important discrepancies when compared with other evidence. There was a considerable deficiency in income from interest and dividends taxed at source (mainly affecting incomes below £2,000); plus an apparent omission, as compared with National Insurance statistics, of over a million women in paid employment. The IR (1952, pp. 96 & 117) produced a corrected distribution, to include these incomes. Further revisions were made when the 1949 data were published in the 1954 "Blue Book" (Britain's main national accounting publication). These appear to involve an adjustment raising the aggregate value of real property (Schedule A) income, to take account of the average rise in rents since the last revaluation in 1935/36 (Lydall, 1959, p. 26) .
We have compiled a composite series, using the official "Blue Book" figures for incomes from £250-£20,000, together with incomes over £20,000 from the original 1949 SPI.
No disaggregated data for incomes over £20,000 were available in any tabulation other than the SPI, though total numbers of incomes, and their amounts, for this range change very little between the different estimates. Data for incomes of £135-150 and £150-250 are from the corrected (Table 110 ) IR figures. The collated table has totals for incomes and numbers of tax units over £250 which are identical to the National Statistical Agency (a predecessor of the Office for National Statistics) estimates, to three significant figures.
[ Table 7 near here]
NEW ESTIMATES FOR TOP INCOME SHARES AND THEIR EARNED AND UNEARNED COMPONENTS
We present the five 1911-49 British income distribution estimates based on direct data, (rather than adjustments to previous years' estimates) in Table 8 . For three of these, 1911, 1937, and 1949 , the data are disaggregated into earned and unearned components, enabling us to explore the relative importance of capital and labour income in the declining incomes of the rich. Our analysis is restricted to the top five percent of the population, as the 1911 survey does not classify lower incomes (which were not then subject to income tax). However, we are still able to examine top incomes at all typical bench-marks up to this level (the top 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1 and 5 per cent of British tax units). Moreover, our unusually detailed data for very top 15 incomes enables us to examine total income shares of the top 0.001 per cent -the super-rich group; comprising 228 tax units in 1911.
We considered two alternative approaches for estimating income shares. The first is the standard method in the literature, the Pareto distribution (e.g. Atkinson and Piketty, 2010) , and the second is to assume a linear approximation between the tabulated intervals. The Pareto approach has been found to be an accurate approximation towards the upper end of the income distribution (particularly the top 1 to 0.1 percent), but performs poorly for levels above the 0.1 percent (Stamp, 1914, pp. 200-204; Feenberg and Poterba, 1992, pp. 172-73 Tables 1, 6 , and 7), we use linear interpolation, but also provide comparative estimates using the mean split histogram method for 1911, to allow direct comparisons with Atkinson's (2007) estimates for the subsequent benchmark years. The two methods provide very similar values.
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[ [ Tables 9 and 10 near here] Table 9 shows ratios of unearned to total income for our three bench-mark years, and Table 10 shows earned and unearned income weightings for the top 0.01 percent to 5.0 percent of British incomes. In 1911 the top 0.01 percent (the highest income fraction that can be derived from the earned and unearned income data for all years) relied on capital income for 78 percent of their total income, though this fell to only 55 percent by 1949. However, larger falls in unearned incomes were experienced by broader income groups within the top 5 percent, with the top 1 percent -which received almost three quarters of total income from capital sources in 1911 -having only 28 percent of income from this source and the top 5 percent having a precipitous fall in their capital income weighting, from 63 percent to only 13 percent. The data thus reveal both a considerable decline in the relative importance of top capital incomes and a more severe relative decline for the lowest-income segments of our top income group.
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WHAT CAUSED THE FALL IN TOP INCOME SHARES?
Disaggregating the earned and unearned components of top incomes is important, as nineteenth century Britain's extreme income inequality compared to other developed nations has been linked to its unusually high inequality in wealth and, therefore, investment income (Lindert, 1991, pp. 220-24 Wealth is typically much more unequally distributed than income, while inequality of capital income typically exceeds wealth inequality. The upper ranks of the wealth distribution achieve higher yields on their capital owing to: higher returns for larger holdings in the same asset class (for example bank accounts); lower proportional transactions costs; greater possibilities for diversification to achieve higher yields at any given level of total portfolio risk;
and a weaker preference for liquidity (Daniels and Campion, 1936, pp. 60-62; Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, p. 173; Lydall and Tipping, 1961, p. 95) .
Our three benchmark years show a marked decline in the contribution of unearned, to total, income. The lack of annual, or relatively frequent, data on capital incomes prevent timeseries analysis of the causes of the collapse in top capital incomes. However, the drivers of this process appear to be broadly similar to those identified for other western countries -a series of shocks and policy-responses that negatively impacted on wealth and/or income flowing from (Mandler, 1997, p. 228) . Some studies argue that land-owners shrewdly disposed of land in the early post-Armistice period, using the proceeds to diversify their asset base, and/or shift into safer securities, thereby maintaining their nominal wealth (Howkins, 2003, p. 58; Mandler, 1997, pp. 242-3; Rothery, 2007 (Feinstein, 1972, pp. T5-T6) .
There was also downward pressure on interest and dividends, which dominated unearned, and total, top incomes by 1937 (see Figure 2 ). Prior to 1914 Britain devoted a higher proportion of savings to capital export than any other major country has ever done (Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, 1982, p. 353 (Kynaston, 1991, p. 143) .
[Figures 2 near here]
Periodic pressures to divest of securities on unattractive terms further lowered portfolio yields. During the First World War the Treasury sought to acquire dollar securities and sell them in New York. Patriotic appeals were followed by a penal tax on their dividends/interest in the 1916 Budget, while from January 1917 the Treasury had powers to requisition securities for selling (Morgan, 1952, pp. 326-331) . British overseas investments, valued at almost £4,000 million on the eve of the First World War, are estimated to have declined by around 15 -25 percent owing to these measures (Feinstein, 1990; Hardach, 1977, p. 289-90) .
Then in the 1930s "cheap money" policy led to a boom in conversion issues, replacing high- To some extent the decline in unearned top incomes can be directly linked to improvements in incomes and living standards for the bottom 90 percent of the population. For example, rent control, introduced in 1915, depressed the incomes of landlords, but substantially reduced the real value of a major household expenditure burden, in a country where around 90 percent of households were private tenants (Merrett, 1982, p.1) . Rent control also subsequently led to extensive sales of house property portfolios, mainly to sitting tenants, at prices reflecting their low, controlled, rents (Speight, 2000, pp. 39-40) . Meanwhile, the scarcity of low-risk, higher yielding assets during the inter-war years led to substantial deposits in building societies the lowest recorded ratios of weekly house mortgage costs to average incomes (Scott, 2014, pp. 107-8) . These conditions also made it easier for local authorities to raise loans for a series of inter-war social housing programmes, cumulatively creating around 1.3 million new homes (Speight, 2000, chapters 4-5; Scott, 2013, pp. 98-127) . Meanwhile restrictions on overseas new issues led the City of London to become increasingly involved in British industrial financeexpanding industrial growth and employment -despite protests from City-insiders that domestic industrial issues involved more work and less profit than the foreign loan stock that merchant banks had hitherto focused on (Kynaston, 2000, pp. 131-137 & 295) .
While capital incomes dominate the top income decline, our estimates also show a substantial fall in top earned incomes. This appears more surprising, given that the ratio of earnings for professional and managerial occupations, compared to all workers, remained relatively stable between 1913/14 and 1935/36 (Routh, 1965, p. 107) . However, it mainly reflects a decline in Schedule D incomes -which were classed as earned income, but included a substantial element of profits. Schedule D mainly covers profits from businesses and professions (including employers' salaries). While self-employment incomes are commonly, but not universally, categorised as earned income in national personal income series (Bengtsson and Waldenstrom, 2018, p. 720) , this schedule also includes returns on capital invested in unincorporated businesses by proprietors and partners, together with some items of pure investment income -for example colonial and foreign securities (other than government securities) and interest on War securities not taxed at source (Atkinson, 2007, p. 161; UK, Inland Revenue, 1912, pp. 111-113; idem, 1939, p. 56) .
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In 1911 Schedule D accounted for 61.8 percent of all taxable income. However, its contribution fell to 42.6 percent in 1929; 31.9 percent in 1937 , and 26.2 percent in 1949 (UK Inland Revenue, 1920 idem, 1940, p. 56; idem, 1953, p. 42) . This largely reflected the advantages of incorporation as a vehicle for tax avoidance. The whole of a company's profits could be re-invested, or otherwise not distributed, in order to avoid tax, while it was also possible to distribute company profits in the form of capital gains (which were not subject to income tax in Britain). 24 Given this switch of much Schedule D income from "earned" to "unearned" income, the underlying collapse in unearned income over 1911-49 is thus likely to have been substantially greater than the above figures suggest.
CONCLUSIONS
Our re-discovered 1911 income distribution estimate confirms the findings of previous studies that Britain's pre-1914 income inequality was high by international standards, primarily owing to extreme British inequality in unearned income, in turn reflecting its peculiarly unequal wealth distribution (Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli, 2018; Lindert, 1991, pp. 220-224 (Piketty, 2003 (Piketty, , p. 1037 Piketty and Saez, 2003, pp. 8-9) . The following decades witnessed a severe long-term reduction in British factor incomes for rent, interest, and dividends, which substantially reduced unearned income inequality and dominated the fall in overall income inequality. This explains the paradox between the observed reduction in income inequality and the lack of evidence for any substantial redistribution of earnings between salary and wage-earners. However, despite having closed much of the relative gap with America, British incomes remained more unequal than in the USA or France in 1949, a result consistent with recent research on long-term movements in British and American top wealth shares (Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Morelli, 2018, pp. 43-45) .
To some extent Britain's income inequality reduction represented a genuine redistribution from the rich to lower income groups (even prior to income tax and fiscal transfers). The reduction in factor incomes from rent, interest and dividends provided greater scope for higher factor incomes for wages and salaries, while lower income families benefited directly from controlled rents and, to some extent, from lower interest rates and greater credit availability for house-purchases. However, the data also reflect rising tax avoidance and evasion, incentivised by a ten-fold increase in the top rate of income tax between 1911 and 1949, either directly, or by companies (for example by retaining profits to benefit their shareholders in the longer-term, rather than incurring heavy taxes on their dividends).
While Britain started from a position of greater income inequality than other major industrial nations, its overall trend towards reduced inequality, and the underlying causes, appear broadly similar. Research on France, the USA, and Japan has found that reductions in income inequality during the first half of the twentieth century were also driven by severe shocks to the capital holdings of the wealthy, including depressions, bankruptcies, war-time inflation, declining real asset prices, and the fiscal shocks of war finance (Piketty, 2003 (Piketty, , pp. 1011 (Piketty, -1019 Piketty and Saez, 2006, p. 203; idem, 2003, p. 12; idem, 2013, p. 474) . In common with Piketty and Saez's findings for the USA and France (Piketty, 2003 (Piketty, , p. 1011 Piketty and Saez, 2013, pp. 461-2; idem, 2003, pp. 3-11 & 33-35 Abrams, that the levelling tendency of wars is proportional to the extent to which low-status groups and classes become essential to the war effort -leading to policy responses and institutional changes that might persist well beyond the war period. 25 Such impacts would be reinforced by tax increases, which reduced even "pre-tax" personal incomes; for example higher corporation taxes reduced dividends and incentivised firms to retain profits. However, another important factor concerns the changing sources of top incomes. In both Britain and the USA the contribution of capital incomes to top incomes has declined substantially since the 1970s, in favour of salary and entrepreneurial incomes (Piketty and Saez, 2003, p. 17) . Thus Marx's (1954, 585-589) prediction that shocks lead to the concentration of capital would imply that top entrepreneurs and executives might benefit from them, while rentiers, receiving incomes from more diversified portfolios of securities, would be more likely to suffer from their negative aggregate economic impact.
Another related factor governing the impact of shocks on income distribution, under different institutional environments, concerns the ability of nation states to tax rich individuals, or the factor incomes they receive. The 1911-49 inequality reduction was driven, at least in part, by the progressive collapse of the liberal, globalised, world order, which made it more difficult for the rich to seek out more attractive overseas outlets for their investments and made policies such as capital controls more politically expedient and acceptable. Similarly, the policy liberalizations of the 1980s that heralded the start of the new globalisation (and the resumption of growing income inequality in western nations) have made it far easier for the rich to offshore 25 For a summary of this literature, see Marwick (1968) , pp. 56-58. their assets, or themselves, either in search of better investments opportunities, or jurisdictions more suited to protecting their wealth. Sources: IR data and total person income, as for Table 1 . "BSR" estimate, Lindert and Williamson, (1983), p. 99; modified in Lindert, (2000) . , 1911 , , 1918 , , 1919 , , 1937 , AND 1949 (PERCENT OF TAX UNITS) 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01%
Source: Atkinson (2007 ), pp. 141-142. Notes: For 1918 , 1919 , 1937 , Atkinson replaces the Super-Tax data estimates with official estimates of the income distribution.
